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Ye’s book may be read in (at least two ways): (1) as a treatise on the philoso-
phy of mathematics, and (2) as a contribution to constructive mathematics, or
more precisely, to that variety of constructivism which the author calls “strict
finitism”. In the following, I shall first present the book from the second view-
point and then turn to the philosophical issues in the last part of this review. In
doing so, I will first present Ye’s logical framework SF and then briefly sketch
how substantial parts of mathematics are developed within this framework. Fi-
nally, I will turn to the author’s views on the philosophy of mathematics.
The System SF. In chapter 2 of the book, a type-theoretic system SF (“Strict
Finitism”) is presented which, in chs. 3–8, serves as a foundation for the devel-
opment of some branches of mathematics which figure large in applications of
mathematics in other disciplines. The types of SF are the basic type o of natu-
ral numbers plus all the functional types (of arbitrary order) (σ1, . . . , σn → σ).
There are variables xσ1 , x
σ
2 , . . . for each type σ and the constants 0 (zero,
type o), S (successor, type (o → o)) as well as the following operators of type
(o, o→ o): + (addition), · (multiplication), pow (exponentiation), and I< (char-
acteristic function of the less-than-relation). Using this basic material plus the
λ-operator, arithmetical terms, abstraction terms, and application terms in the
usual way. There are, however, four additional ways to construct complex terms
of SF: (1) by the choice operator J , (2) the recursion operator Re, and the gen-
eralized (3) sum (
∑
) and (4) product (
∏
) operator. If t is of type o and t1
and t2 are terms of the same type σ, then J(t, t1, t2) is of type o. The term
J(t, t1, t2), then, denotes the value of t1 if the value of t is 0 and the value of
t2 otherwise. The functioning of the recursion operator Re will be explained in
the paragraph. Let t[i] be a term of type o which contains the free variable i,
which is of type o, too. We may say, then, that t[i] represents a function f from
N to N. Let now r be a term of type o which does not contain free occurrences
of i and denotes the number m, then the terms
∑
i≤r t[i] and
∏
i≤r t[i] denote,
respectively, the sum and the product of the first m + 1 values of the function
f .
It remains to explain the recursion operator Re which is the most complicated
of the term constructors of SF. Re is used to define unary functions by primitive
bounded recursion. The Re-operator requires four argument expressions: three
terms—say s, r, and t of type o—and one, say b, of type (o → o). The term s
stands for the argument of the function to be defined by recursion, and r denotes
the value of that function for the argument 0. The function denoted by b bounds
the function to be defined. This means that the value of the latter function for
some arbitrary argument may never exceed the value of the function denoted
by b for that same argument. Finally, the term t of type o is required to contain
two variables—says i and j—which occur free in t but not in b, r, and s. Thus
the term t, which we may also denote by “t[i, j]”, represents, relative to the two
parameters i and j, a binary function mapping of pairs of natural numbers to
natural numbers again. Intuitively, the function represented by t[i, j] calculates
the values of the function to be defined by recursion in the individual steps of
the recursion. The i-parameter stands for the step of the recursion and the j-
parameter for the argument whose value is to be computed. When applying the
Re-operator to the argument expressions s, r, t, and b the two parameters i and
j become, of course, bound. The resulting term (of type o) is Reij(s, r, b, t[i, j]).
The formulas of SF are equations t = s of terms t and s of the lowest type
o and truth-functional combinations ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ, and ϕ→ ψ. Negation ¬ϕ is
defined by ϕ → S0 = 0. There are no quantifiers; generality, however, can be
expressed by means of free variables. There are six groups of axioms for SF. (i)
The axioms for the propositional connectives are those of classical logic. (ii) The
axioms of identity require reflexivity, Euclidicity, and substitutability of equals
for equals. (iii) The arithmetical axioms include (iii.a) the requirement that 0 is
not a successor number and that the successor operation is an injection; (iii.b)
the usual recursive definitions of the arithmetical operations; (iii.c) the obvious
axioms for the <-relation (determined by the J-operator). There are (iv) two
axioms for the choice operator J and (v) two others for λ- and abstraction-terms.
Finally, (vi) the two axioms
REij(0, r, b, t[i, j]) = J(I<(r, b(0)), r, b(0)) (1)
REij(Ss, r, b, t[i, j]) = J(I<(t
′, b(Ss)), t′, b(Ss)), (2)
characterize the recursion operator, where t′ in (2) is the term REij(s, r, b, t[i, j]).
Since equality is not available in SF for higher-order terms, the axioms of
group (iv) and (v) cannot be formulated as equations relating the term describ-
ing the application of an operator to its argument(s) to the term denoting the
outcome of that application, because such an outcome may belong to a higher-
order type. Instead replacement principles are used. The notation “s{t}” should
be understood as marking some determinate occurrence of the subterm t in term
s. Given a term r, then, of the same type as t, s{r} is the term resulting from
s{t} by replacing the distinguished occurrence of t by r. If t is the variable x
and every occurrence of that variable is replaced by r, square brackets are used
instead of braces. Thus the original term is denoted by “s[x]” and the result
of the substitution by “s[x/r]”. Finally, we adopt the convention to indicate
sequences of terms by small boldface letters. E.g., s[x/r] is the result of simulta-
neously substituting (all occurrences) of the variables from x by corresponding
variables from r, and λx.t is the term λx1.λx2 . . . λxm.t, where x is the sequence
x1x2 . . . xm. Given these notational conventions, the choice axioms (group iv
from above) may be formulated as follows:
s{J(0, t1, t2)} = s{t1} (3)
s{J(St, t1, t2)} = s{t2} (4)
The first reduction axiom (group v from above) states that “application dis-
tributes over choice”, the second one describes the connection between λ-abstraction
and application.
s{Ap(J(t, t1, t2), s)} = s{J(t,Ap(t1, s),Ap(t2, s))} (5)
s{Ap(λx.t, r)} = s{t[r/x]} (6)
The inference rules of SF are modus ponens and the induction rule, which allows
to derive ϕ[t] from the premisses ϕ[0] and ϕ[n]→ ϕ[Sn].
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Quantifiers do not belong to the basic vocabulary of SF bounded versions
of them can, however, be introduced by definition.
(∀i ≤ m)ϕ[i] ≡df
∑
i≤m tϕ = 0 (7)
(∃i ≤ m)ϕ[i] ≡df ¬(∀i ≤ m)¬ϕ[i] (8)
In the definitions above, the term tϕ denotes the truth-value of the formula ϕ.
In SF such a term can be built up by an induction on the construction of ϕ. A
bounded minimization-operator can be defined in a similar way:
(µi ≤ m)ϕ[i] ≡df
∑
i≤m
∏
j≤i tϕ[j]. (9)
The elementary recursive functions are all definable within SF and the Fun-
damental Theorem of Arithmetic is provable within this system. The reduction
axioms (5) and (6), taken in the left-to-right-direction, define a reduction rela-
tion for which a normal form theorem can be proved. The subterms of a term
in normal form which only contains free variables of type o are either of this
type, too, or among the constants S, +, ·, pow , I<. This implies that each
such term t represents a function which is composed from the base functions
by composition, bounded recursion, finite sum, and finite product since, by the
means of the reduction axioms, t can be proved in SF to equal its normal form.
Hence every term which only contains free variables of type o represents an
elementary recursive function.
As the author mentions (p. 36), his SF resembles two systems which have
been suggested in connection with Go¨del’s Dialectica-interpretation of intuition-
istic arithmetic (cf. MR0102482) from 1958, namely the system T̂0 of Avigad
and Feferman (cf. MR1640329) and the system T0 of Troelstra (cf. Troelstra’s
introduction to the reprint of Go¨del’s article in volume II of the latter’s Collected
Works, MR1032517). T0 is a type-theoretic logic of computable functions of any
finite type. Unlike SF, T0 has quantifiers and allows for unbounded recursion;
and it uses combinators instead of the λ-operator. Go¨del’s result (as reformu-
lated by Troelstra) is that for each formula ϕ of the language of intuitionistic
arithmetic there exists a formula ϕD of T0 which has the form ∃x∀yϕD[x,y]
where ϕD(x,y) is quantifier-free and a a sequence of terms t such that ϕD[t,y]
is derivable in his T.
The ideas behind the Dialectica-interpretation enter into a notational device
introduced by the author in order to represent the strictly finitist mathematics
based on SF in a way which approaches the mode of expression in less restricted
forms of mathematics. Let ϕ[x,y,p] be a formula of SF such the variables in
x, y, p are different from each other and are all the free variables of the formula.
An expression ∃x∀yϕ[x,y,p] (where the variables of p function as parameters)
of the Go¨del type is called a “claim in strict finitism”. Note that a claim is not a
formula of SF. A “proof” of the claim ∃x∀yϕ[x,y,p] is a sequence of SF-terms
t (where the variables of t may contain variables from p but not from y) plus a
derivation of ϕ[t,y,p] in SF. A language of claims is defined by introducing logi-
cal operators, both connectives and quantifiers, to build up complex claims from
more basic ones. To each mode of combination there corresponds a translation
rule which specifies the content of the claim in SF-terminology. These transla-
tion rules are formally identical with the Go¨del-Troelstra-rules for interpreting
arithmetical formulas in T0. It is shown then that the rules of intuitionistic
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logic and the axiom of choice (in the form ∀∗∃∗ϕ[z, w] →∗ ∃W ∗∀∗ϕ[z,W (z)],
where the starred operators belong to the new “language of claims”) are valid
for the “logic of claims” induced by the translation rules.
Formalizing Mathematical Theories in SF. The formalization of various
parts of mathematics within the SF-framework in Chapters 3–8 is based upon
the author’s treatment of sets and, especially, of the number sets N, Z, Q, R
and C. A set is specified by a “set form”, which is a pair A = 〈ϕ[a], ψ[a, b]〉 of
formulas where the indicated variables are the only free ones in the respective
formula. The set form is said to be of type τ if this is the type of the variable
a; the variable b has to be of the same type. The formula ϕ[a] provides the
membership condition of the set and the relation represented by ψ[a, b] is the
equality relation associated with the set. Hence “ϕ[a]” is also written as “a ∈ A”
and “ψ(a, b)” as “a =A b”. The set form A = 〈ϕ[a], ψ[a, b]〉 of type τ is said to
be a set of that type iff =A is an equivalence relation and both membership in
A and equality relative to A are extensional. The two terms r, t of the same
type denote extensionally identical objects, i.e., r ' t, iff it holds true that
∀x1 . . .xm(r(x1) . . . (xm) = t(x1) . . . (m)) where x1, . . . , xm are sequences of
variables of appropriate types. The requirement that ∈ and =A are extensional
means that ∀a, b(a ' b ∧ a ∈ A→ b ∈ A ∧ a =A b).
In the case of N formulas n = n and n = m (m, n of type o) can be
chosen for the membership and the equality condition, respectively. Integers
are coded by natural numbers in such a way that the even natural number
represent the positive integers whereas the odd numbers the negative ones. The
same set form which has been used for N can thus be used for Z, too, but
the definitions of the arithmetical operators must, of course, be adapted to
the coding. The (positive) rational numbers are defined then as pairs of natural
numbers by using a pairing function definable i SF. The reals are represented by
(elementary recursive) Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, and the complex
numbers finally as pairs of rationals.
If the membership statement a ∈ A is the claim ∃x∀yϕ[a,x,y], then the
membership statement is also written as a ∈x A. In this case, the variables x
range over “witnesses” for a’s being a member of A. A function f : A → B
is sensitive to the witnesses for membership in the domain A of type τ . This
means that the unary function f is actually of type τ, τ1, . . . , τm → σ where σ is
the type of the range B and τ1, . . . , τm are the types of the witnesses. Thus in
order to compute the values of f for an argument a ∈x A one has to calculate
the value of f(a, b1, . . . , bm) for some suitable witnesses. It is required that the
value of the function is independent of the choice of the witnesses. Thus f is a
function from A to B iff the following two conditions are fulfilled.
∀xx(x ∈x A→ f(x,x) ∈ B) (10)
∀xxyy(x ∈x A ∧ y ∈y A ∧ x =Y y → f(x,x) = f(y,y)) (11)
The just sketched fundamentals are used to develop a considerable part
of mathematics in chaps. 3–8 of the book. The exposition of the disciplines
dealt with is often inspired by Errett Bishop’s constructive mathematics (cf.
MR221878, MR0804042, MR0270894) but the details are adapted to the special
framework of SF. Ch. 3 deals with real analysis, ch. 4 with metric spaces, and
ch. 5 with complex analysis. Measure theory and integration is treated in ch. 6;
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Hilbert spaces are dealt with in ch. 7, and Riemannian geometry in the final ch.
8. All chapters contain proves of (constructive versions of) substantial results
within the framework of strict finitism. Thus, for instance, constructive versions
of the Intermediate Value Theorem and Rolle’s Theorem are proved in ch. 3,
the Cauchy Integral Theorem in ch. 5, and the Spectral Theorem in ch. 7.
Philosophical Topics. Unlike other contributions to constructive mathemat-
ics, Ye’s book is not written with a revisionary intention to eliminate dubious
patterns of inference (as, e.g., applications of the tertium non datur or reductio
ad absurdum) in mathematical reasoning. For Feng the main philosophical prob-
lem with classical mathematics is not its internal logical structure but rather its
applicability to reality. Classical mathematics accepts infinity in various forms,
but the best scientific theories currently available provide confident knowledge
only about a strictly finite part of the universe. Feng repeatedly states that
nothing is known about things above the cosmological scale (about 1045m) or
below the Planck scale (about 10−35 m, 10−45 s, etc.) — if there are such things
at all. Hence the problem arises why “infinite mathematics” is applicable to
“finite things”.
A concrete instance of an application of mathematics within a certain sci-
entific discipline is analyzed by Feng in the following way. A new result ϕ of
the discipline is inferred from a set Γ of premisses: Γ ` ϕ. Let L be the lan-
guage of the discipline at issue. The premiss set Γ can be split up into three
subsets (Γ = Γr ∪ Γm ∪ Γb) belonging to three different sublanguages of L .
The sentences from Γr coming from sublanguage Lm describes the application
situation in realistic terms without using any abstract notion. The conclusion
ϕ, too, belongs to Γr. The semantic model Ar of Lm is thus built up from real
physical entities. In order to derive ϕ, however, the sentences in Γm from the
sublanguage Lm have to be used, too. Lm admits the abstract notions of clas-
sical mathematics. Finally, the “bridging” sentences from Γb are also applied
in the inference; they relate the abstract notions of Lm to the realistic ones of
Lr. One readily recognizes here that Ye’s view of L very much resemble the
conception of the language of science which have been elaborated by Rudolf
Carnap and other empiricist philosophers (cf., for instance, Rudolf Carnap’s
contribution to the Bernays-Festschrift, Zbl 0088.24416). In a valid application
(i) the premisses from Γr hold true in the model Ar and (ii) the inference Γ ` ϕ
guarantees that this is true also for the conclusion ϕ. The “Logical Problem of
Applicability” raised by Feng then is the question why it can be the case that
Γ ` ϕ implies Ar |= ϕ though the premisses from Lm ∪Lb with their abstract
notions cannot be true in the purely physical model Ar.
The answer given to this question by the author is that a set of realistic
premisses Γ ′r is “implicitly implied” (p. 20) byLm∪Lb such that both Ar |= Γr∪
Γ ′r and Γr ∪ Γ ′r ` ϕ. As regards the mathematical content of Γ ′r, the premisses
of this set have to eschew every abstract concept and assumption which is not
supported by our limited knowledge of the universe. In particular, the infinite —
neither in its actual nor its potential form — may not presupposed by any of the
premisses in Γ ′r. The “Conjecture of Finitism” is that the mathematics for
applications in the realm of natural phenomena above the Planck scale can
always be developed in a strictly finitist way without assuming any form of
infinity. The endeavors described in the first part of this review serve to develop
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a suitable formalization of mathematics supporting that conjecture.
Given the author’s specific refutation of the infinite one would expect him
to hold within philosophy of mathematics an ultra-intuitionist view as it has
been put forward by, e.g., Yessenin-Volpin (cf., e.g., MR0644507, MR0644507)
rather than the finitist attitude encoded in his SF. After all, his reason to refute
the infinite is the claim that the number of objects in the part of the universe
which is known to us is bounded by a (presumably very large) natural number
N so that it is for purely physical reasons not possible actually to construct a
number greater than N . However, in a brief passage of the book an alternative
formulation SFN of SF is mentioned “which is perhaps more faithful to the idea
of strict finitism” (p. 51). As compared with the original SF, SFN contains
a new constant N of type o. Intuitively, “N” stands for the largest natural
number. A new successor axiom SN = N is added and the other axioms of SF
have to be reformulated in a way that ensures that no numerical term takes on
a value exceeding N . Hence SFN is the theory of the finite segment of natural
numbers up to N . Of course, the SFN -version of theorems from SF will have
to be prefixed by statements asserting that the terms involved denote numbers
less than N .
Reviewed by Klaus Robering
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